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Since their indoctrination into American politics during the 
Progressive Era,1 primary elections have served as a filter for candidates to 
enter the general election.2 Primaries are predominantly party functions: 
                                                     
* Taylor Larson, J.D., is a Government Affairs Associate at LS2group in Des Moines, Iowa. 
She owes her success to and would like to thank her parents, Riley McDonald, and her dog 
Jack. 
** Joshua Duden, J.D. Candidate 2019, is a Juris Doctorate Candidate at Drake University 
Law School in Des Moines, Iowa graduating in May 2019. He would like to thank his 
parents, Ryan Haltom, his dogs Cooper and Baxter, and his cat Maui. 
1 Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How a Democracy Dies, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/145916/democracy-dies-donald-trump-contempt-for-
american-political-institutions. 
2 See Seth Masket, What’s the Point of Primaries?, PAC. STANDARD (May 4, 2015), 
https://psmag.com/news/whats-the-point-of-primaries. This, however, is not to say general 
elections do not serve a similar purpose: elections, in general: 
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although the process varies from state to state and is regulated by individual 
state legislatures,3 primary elections allow voters of a particular party to 
nominate the candidate they think best represents them against other parties 
in the general election.4 As the United States (U.S.) population has made hard 
“left” and “right” turns in political ideology, from the creation of democratic 
                                                     
[F]unction as safety valves. . . . Herbert Hoover and the Republicans failed 
to respond to the crushing weight of the Great Depression, so the electorate 
brought a new president and a new party to power. Ronald Reagan was 
propelled to office to restore America’s standing in the world. Small-scale 
adjustments happen in most elections, and occasionally so-called 
realignments dramatically change the policy agenda for a generation.  
Daniel M. Shea, Our Addiction to Elections is Killing American Democracy, NATION (Apr. 
12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/our-addiction-to-elections-is-killing-our-
democracy/.   
3 State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx; but see 
generally John R. Labbe, Louisiana’s Blanket Primary After California Democratic Party v. 
Jones, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 721 (Winter 2002). Standard primary elections come in three 
categories: open, closed, and blanket. Id. at 734. The National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) discusses each type in depth, including hybrids and combinations of 
types and lists which states participate in each. See State Primary Election Types, supra. For 
example, Iowa is considered to participate in a “partially open” primary: “Iowa asks voters 
to choose a party on the state voter registration form, yet it allows a primary voter to publicly 
change party affiliation for purposes of voting on primary Election Day.” Id. John Labbe 
mentions, however, limits “on a state’s ability to regulate a political party’s nomination 
process.” Labbe, supra at 722. Namely, he discusses the freedom of association in the First 
Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. This Article also 
discusses blanket primaries, particularly with concern to primary systems in place in 
California and Washington prior to the enactment of their most recent top-two systems. See 
generally id.  
In a blanket primary system, voters are not required to affiliate with a 
political party and may vote for any candidate on the ballot. The candidate 
from each political party who receives the most votes in the primary 
advances to the general election. A blanket primary is sometimes confused 
with an open primary in which voters may pick candidates regardless of 
their own party registration, but may only choose among candidates from 
a single party of the voter’s choice. 
Blanket Primary, TAEGAN GODDARD’S POL. DICTIONARY, 
https://politicaldictionary.com/words/blanket-primary/ (last visited, Feb. 9, 2019). It is the 
authors’ opinion that while blanket (similar to top two) and open primaries differ, all are the 
wrong options for national primary reform based on factors discussed later in this Article. 
Labbe, supra at 753. “Open” throughout this Article can be assumed to refer to any system 
that is not traditionally closed. 
4 Labbe, supra note 3 (“The chief function of political parties in the United States is the 
selection of nominees for public office. Through the nomination process, political parties 
select candidates the party will support in general elections.”). 
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socialists5 to the modern Tea Party voters,6 American political scientists 
question “whether our current electoral system is capable of reducing a large 
field of candidates to one winner who accurately reflects the preferences of 
the median.”7  
To combat partisan politics, Washington and California grappled with 
election reform, especially reform to their own primary systems.8 They did 
so in the early 2000s,9 following the argument “that all voters should be able 
to participate in primary elections. . . . everyone should be able to participate 
in the nomination of candidates, even for parties to which they hold no 
allegiance.”10 These states moved to a top-two version of an open primary, 
later donned the “Jungle Primary,” in which all candidates would face off in 
one primary election.11 The first and second place primary winners, 
Republican and Democrat (two Republicans or two Democrats),12 would 
move on to the general election, regardless if there was party balance.13  
Today, as frustration with polarization reaches lawmakers, some 
politicians even advocate for an overhaul of states’ primary systems similar 
                                                     
5 See Meagan Day, Democratic Socialism, Explained by a Democratic Socialist, VOX (Aug. 
1, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2018/8/1/17637028/bernie-sanders-
alexandria-ocasio-cortez-cynthia-nixon-democratic-socialism-jacobin-dsa.  
6 See About Us, TEA PARTY (last visited Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.teaparty.org/about-us/.  
7 Chenwei Zhang, Note, Towards a More Perfect Election: Improving the Top-Two Primary 
for Congressional and State Races, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 617 (2012) (emphasis added). 
Eugene Stearns, a Miami attorney, expressed a similar opinion in January 2018 in a Sun 
Sentinel opinion piece advocating for a top-two primary system in Florida based on its 
supposed results in California: “A friend in California told me the most significant difference 
is how elected officials behave. In Florida, it would make it much harder for the NRA to pass 
the utterly extreme laws the Republicans are forced to stomach while pretending they agree.” 
Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, ‘Top Two’ Election Choices Better than None, SUN SENTINEL 
(Jan. 31, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.sun-sentinal.com/opinion/editorials/fl-op-editorial-
top-two-primary-election-20180131-story.html. There is proof, however, discussed later in 
this Article, that a change to open primary elections would not produce the median result for 
which they were intended. Id. 
8 Zhang, supra note 7.  
9 Id.  
10 Masket, supra note 2.  
11 Adam Nagourney, Here’s How California’s ‘Jungle Primary’ System Works, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/us/california-primary-election-rules-
system.html. 
12 Libertarian, Green, no-party, or third-party candidates are also eligible to win in a top-two 
primary, though it is more unlikely based on system constraints. As such, Republican and 
Democratic candidates are simply mentioned as the most likely to succeed under this system.  
13 Nagourney, supra note 11. 
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to the change in California.14 Senator Chuck Schumer, a Democrat from New 
York and current Minority Leader of the United States Senate, explained his 
support of jungle primaries in a 2014 New York Times op-ed, which stated: 
From 10,000 feet, the structure of our electorate looks to be 
healthy, with perhaps a third of the potential voters who are 
left-leaning Democrats, a third who are right-leaning 
Republicans and a third who are independents in the middle. 
But primaries poison the health of that system and warp its 
natural balance, because the vast majority of Americans don’t 
typically vote in primaries. Instead, it is the “third of the third” 
most to the right or most to the left who come out to vote — 
the 10 percent at each of the two extremes of the political 
spectrum. Making things worse, in most states, laws prohibit 
independents — who are not registered with either party and 
who make up a growing proportion of the electorate — from 
voting in primaries at all.15 
Schumer specifically advocated for an open, top-two primary system 
nationwide.16 He wrote that “[w]e need a national movement to adopt the 
‘top-two’ primary . . . in which all voters, regardless of party registration, can 
vote and the top two vote-getters, regardless of party, then enter a runoff.”17 
He goes on to say that “[t]his would prevent a hard-right or hard-left 
candidate from gaining office with the support of just a sliver of the voters of 
the vastly diminished primary electorate; to finish in the top two, candidates 
from either party would have to reach out to the broad middle.”18 
 There are several issues, however, that arise with usage of open 
primaries, and questions that beg to be answered from the implementation of 
top-two systems in a few liberal leaning states. After analyzing top-two 
systems as they exist in Washington and California, this Article addresses 
open primary systems legally, summarizes cases that challenge them, and 
                                                     
14 See, e.g., Some Lawmakers Want to Open Primaries to Independent Voters, AP (May 22, 
2018), https://www.apnews.com/0f790a17f46d43fab11137e73503691c (citing state 
lawmakers in Pennsylvania); Jeff Stein, Bernie Sanders Says Democrats Should Get Rid of 
Closed Primaries. Is He Right?, VOX (Apr. 28, 2016, 9:50 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11469468/open-primaries-closed-primaries-sanders.  
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applies their analyses along with the First Amendment’s freedom of 
association to open systems that have yet to be challenged. Further, this 
Article compares current top-two primary implementation and its successes, 
pitfalls, and overall goals. Then, to the possible performance of an open 
primary in states, like Iowa, where the standard closed primary is working as 
intended. 
Overall, this article advocates against a national open or top-two 
primary system, both from a practical and legal standpoint. Not only do open 
primary systems fail to create the moderacy for which they were intended, 
but such systems run afoul of a primary’s predominant purpose as a party 
function and also impede on state parties’ First Amendment right of 
association. While the open primary system may be, albeit arguably, working 
in politically homogeneous states like California, a primary election overhaul 
in states like Iowa or Colorado may mean sacrificing an already successful 
closed system at the hands of more gridlock. 
I. THE TOP-TWO SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
 While open primary systems have support from some in Congress,19 
only two states (Washington and California) use a true top-two system for 
partisan elected positions at the federal level.20 
                                                     
19 Id. 
20 State Primary Election Types, supra note 3. Louisiana and Nebraska are also listed as using 
top-two primaries but with variations. Id. Nebraska, according to the NCSL, uses top-two 
for nonpartisan legislative races only. Id. Louisiana’s system, after further research, wholly 
replaces a primary system with a general election: “all candidates appear on a single ballot. 
All registered voters may participate. If a candidate does not receive 50% of the vote there 
is a runoff election between the top two vote getters.” Primary Elections State by State, OPEN 
PRIMARIES, https://www.openprimaries.org/states_louisiana (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). The 
NCSL also provides a list of a host of other states that use a traditional open primary: 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. State 
Primary Election Types, supra note 3.  
In an open primary, voters may choose privately in which primary to vote. 
In other words, voters may choose which party’s ballot to vote, but this 
decision is private and does not register the voter with that party. This 
permits a voter to cast a vote across party lines for the primary election. 
Id. Nebraska is not listed among the federal top-two primary election systems, which utilizes 
a top-two system for its nonpartisan state legislative races but subscribes to a closed primary 
system for its federal and remaining statewide elections. Primary Elections State by State, 
supra. 




After an adverse ruling from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on the state’s use of a blanket primary system,21 Washington 
implemented a top-two system in 2004.22 Known as Initiative 872, the top-
two primary system passed as an “initiative to the people,”23 or a ballot 
measure proposed directly by Washington citizens, rather than the 
legislature.24 Initiative 872 was sponsored by Washington State Grange, a 
“non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to improving the quality of 
life of Washington's residents through the spirit of community service and 
legislative action.”25 Washington State Grange is favored by nearly 60% of 
voters in the state.26 Initiative 872 was later reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States and upheld in 2008.27 
B. California 
In 1996, California voters adopted Proposition 198 to create the 
aforementioned blanket primary system.28 After it was declared 
                                                     
21 See generally, Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).  
22 See Li Zhou, Washington Has a Top-Two Primary. Here’s How it Works., VOX (Aug. 7, 
2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/7/17649564/washington-primary-results. 
According to an opinion piece, the move was fueled by independent Washington state voters 
who were “miffed” and the judicial branch’s dismissal of the blanket primary. Washington 
State Beat California to Top-Two Primary, HERALDNET (June 12, 2018, 1:30 AM), 
https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/washington-state-beat-california-to-top-two-primary/. 
“They enjoyed being able to vote for candidates of either party if they felt they were best for 
the individual offices.” Id.  
23 See Index to Initiative and Referendum History and Statistics, SEC’Y ST., 
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).   
24 Frequently Asked Questions About Circulating Initiative and Referendum Petitions, SEC’Y 
ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). The top 
of the website reads: 
The Washington State Constitution reserves to the people the right to 
approve or reject certain state laws through the process of initiative or 
referendum. A registered voter, or group of voters, desiring to qualify an 
initiative or referendum for the ballot must gather signatures on petitions 
in order to do so. 
25 WASH. ST. GRANGE, http://www.wa-grange.com/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).  
26 See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 447 
(2008).  
27 See The Top Two Primary, Initiative 872, WASH. SEC’Y STA. (last accessed Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/7W4F-5WVG/.  
28 Id. 
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unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000,29 Californians again 
attempted reform in 2010 with Proposition 14—the ballot measure which 
created the jungle primary.30 Supporters of Proposition 14 cited polarization 
and a lack of appeal to moderation, which created a backlog in the California 
legislature.31 This backlog delayed the vote on the state’s budget by nearly 
100 days.32 Proponents sent lawmakers a clear message: this was an effort to 
create more moderate candidates, pass more moderate legislation, and get 
more work done.33  
II. TOP-TWO CONSTITUTIONALITY: EXAMINING THE FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION 
 On the outskirts of election reform, especially any reform to state 
primaries, lies the Constitution—particularly the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. To protect the sanctity of the closed primary, different kinds 
of open primaries and registration systems have been challenged in court by 
the major political parties in the U.S. using these Amendments.34 Both 
plaintiffs and political parties rely on the judicial branch to: balance their 
rights to nominate party candidates, protect the rights of voters to participate 
in their democracy, and preserve the rights of states to regulate the electoral 
process altogether: 
The rationale generally employed by courts evaluating the 
constitutionality of restrictions imposed by state statutes on 
party autonomy has involved a balancing of the state’s interest 
in imposing the restriction against the party’s interest in being 
free from the restriction. The state certainly has an interest in 
                                                     
29 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, California Democratic Party v. Jones, 1999 WL 33611417 
(U.S.); see Sinclair, J. Andrew, Winning from the Center: Frank Bigelow and California’s 
Nonpartisan Primary, 7 CAL. J. OF POL. & POL’Y 1 (2015). 
30 Sinclair, supra note 29.  
31 Id. 
32 Id.; Nagourney, supra note 11 (“But critics-- including Arnold Schwarzenegger, who was 
the Republican governor at the time-- argued that the system was producing ideologically 
extreme candidates who were forced to appeal to the most fervent wings of their party, and 
that was leading to gridlock instead of governance.”). 
33 Jesse McKinley, Calif. Voting Change Could Signal Big Political Shift, N.Y. TIMES (June 
9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/us/politics/10prop.html. (“That no one 
actually knows the real effect of Proposition 14 will be sems almost beside the point to 
frustrated voters. What mattered, supporters said, is that something fundamental about 
politics-- anything fundamental-- had changed.”). 
34 See, e.g., Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
446 (2008); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
2019 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 183 
 
 
promoting the welfare of its citizens by preserving the 
integrity of its electoral process. . . . At the same time, the 
political party has an interest in seeing that its members are 
free to associate and nominate political candidates without 
interference . . . .35 
What remains central to these cases, no matter their outcome, is the 
discussion of the First Amendment right of association, especially in relation 
to political parties and individual voters: 
[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. And, though freedom of belief is central, [t]he First 
Amendment protects political association as well as political 
expression. There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to 
association with others for the common advancement of 
political beliefs and ideas is a form of “orderly group activity” 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The right 
to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an 
integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.36 
The following cases and their discussion of the First Amendment, 
along with their holdings, are integral to the way modern courts would view 
any national primary reform, including reform to a more open system.37 
A.  Tashijan v. Republican Party 
 In Tashjian v. Republican Party, Connecticut Republicans adopted a 
party rule that allowed independent voters to vote in their primaries.38 Unlike 
later precedent, the party supported allowing independent voters the 
opportunity to help choose their candidate.39 “Motivated in part by the 
                                                     
35 Charles G. Geyh, Note, "It's My Party and I’ll Cry if I Want To”: State Intrusions Upon 
the Associational Freedoms of Political Parties—Democratic Party of the United States v. 
Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 211, 219–20 (1983) (“On those occasions 
when a dispute arises from a state’s attempt to regulate its elections in a manner alleged to 
interfere with a political party’s candidate selection process, the question for the courts 
becomes one of how the respective interests of party and state are to be balanced.”). 
36 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (quoting Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).  
37 See also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 
(1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Democratic Party of United States v. 
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). 
38 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210 (1986).  
39 Id. at 212. 
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demographic importance of independent voters in Connecticut politics,” the 
party adopted the rule, which provided, “any elector not enrolled as a member 
of a party shall be eligible to vote in primaries for nomination of [statewide 
and federal] candidates.”40 The party and its officers later sued Julia Tashjian, 
Connecticut’s Secretary of State, for administration of a statute that went 
against their new adoption and required registration before participation in 
any of the state’s primaries.41  
The Republican Party contended that disallowing non-registered 
voters to participate specifically in their primary “impermissibly burden[ed] 
the right of its members to determine for themselves with whom they [would] 
associate, and whose support they [would] seek . . . .”42 The state argued, 
however, that the law was narrowly tailored to advance “the State’s 
compelling interests by ensuring the administrability of the primary system, 
preventing raiding, avoiding voter confusion, and protecting the 
responsibility of party government,” and thus should survive any burden 
imposed by the U.S. Constitution.43 Secretary Tashjian cited “the purchase of 
additional voting machines, the training of additional poll workers, and 
potentially the printing of additional ballot materials . . . .” as evidence that 
the new rule would cost Connecticut too much money.44 
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, was not compelled by the 
state prioritizing cost savings over the party’s First Amendment freedoms:  
While the State is of course entitled to take administrative and 
financial considerations into account in choosing whether or 
not to have a primary system at all, it can no more restrain the 
Republican Party’s freedom of association for reasons of its 
own administrative convenience than it could on the same 
ground limit the ballot access of a new major party.45 
Marshall was equally unimpressed with the state’s need to prevent raiding, a 
crossover voting theory that speculates members of one party would vote in 
the opposition’s primary in order to choose their least viable candidate.46 
Marshall reasoned that forcing registration, which was allowed as late as the 
                                                     
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 210 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-431 (1985)).  
42 Id. at 214. 
43 Id. at 217. 
44 Id. at 218. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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business day before the election, “actually assist[ed] a ‘raid’ by 
independents, which could be organized and implemented at the 11th hour.”47 
Lastly, Justice Marshall addressed the state’s final interest in 
“protecting the integrity of the two-party system and the responsibility of 
party government.” According to Marshall, the state “argue[d] vigorously 
and at length that the closed primary system chosen by the state legislature 
promote[d] responsiveness by elected officials and strengthen[ed] the 
effectiveness of the political parties.”48 Justice Marshall, however, declined 
to be so baited: 
The relative merits of closed and open primaries have been the 
subject of substantial debate since the beginning of this 
century, and no consensus has as yet emerged. Appellant 
invokes a long and distinguished line of political scientists and 
public officials who have been supporters of the closed 
primary. But our role is not to decide whether the state 
legislature was acting wisely in enacting the closed primary 
system in 1955, or whether the Republican Party makes a 
mistake in seeking to depart from the practice of the past 30 
years.49 
Instead, Marshall concluded that the party should be allowed to determine 
“the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which best allows 
it to pursue its political goals . . . .”50 When reviewing the party’s protections, 
citing U.S. v. Wisconsin, Justice Marshall stated “courts may not interfere on 
the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational.”51 
In essence, courts should not interfere to protect “the integrity of the Party 
against the Party itself.”52 After discussion, the Court concluded the 
administrative statute violated the party’s rights under the First and 
Fourteenth amendments.53 
                                                     
47 Id. at 219. 
48 Id. at 222. 
49 Id. at 222–23. 
50 Id. at 224.  
51 Id. (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin., 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 237 (“Our holding today does not establish that state regulation of primary voting 
qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its membership. A party 
seeking, for example, to open its primary to all voters, including members of other parties, 
would raise a different combination of considerations.”). 
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 Dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that the majority was using the First 
Amendment freedom of association too loosely: 
It seems to me fanciful to refer to this as an interest in freedom 
of association between the members of the Republican Party 
and the putative independent voters. The Connecticut voter 
who, while steadfastly refusing to register as a Republican, 
casts a vote in the Republican primary, forms no more 
meaningful “association” with the Party than does the 
independent or the registered Democrat who responds to 
questions by a Republican Party pollster. If the concept of 
freedom of association is extended to such casual contacts, it 
ceases to be of any analytic use.54 
B. California Democratic Party v. Jones 
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the California Democratic 
Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, 
and the Peace and Freedom Party all joined to bring suit against the California 
Secretary of State, alleging the state’s nonpartisan blanket primary system55 
violated their First Amendment right to freedom of association.56 The 
aforementioned primary system at issue, Initiative Proposition 198, provided 
voters’ ballots that “lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and 
allows the voter to choose freely among them.”57 Respondents, the California 
Secretary of State and Californians for an Open Primary, “rest[ed] their 
defense of the blanket primary upon the proposition that primaries play an 
integral role in citizens’ selection of public officials.”58 They contended that 
“primaries are public rather than private proceedings, and the States may and 
must play a role in ensuring that they serve the public interest.”59 
Accordingly, respondents asserted, “Proposition 198 . . . [was] simply a rather 
pedestrian example of a State’s regulating its system of elections,”60 which 
                                                     
54 Id. at 235 (Scalia, dissenting); see Wisconsin., 450 U.S. at 122 (1981). 
55 See Democratic Party v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Jones also 
distinguishes the ‘nonpartisan blanket primary’ in which voters can vote for anyone on the 
primary ballot, and then the top vote-getters regardless of party run against each other in the 
general election.”); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 571 (2000). 
56 Jones, 530 U.S. at 571. 
57 Id. at 570. 
58 Id. at 572. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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California should be allowed to do, unfettered from judicial or federal 
scrutiny. 
Justice Scalia, however, was not swayed by such an argument.61 After 
determining that Proposition 198 was a “clear and present danger” to the right 
of political parties to associate because of the increased potential for sabotage 
and crossover voting in the opposing party’s nomination,62 he held that 
primaries must be preserved as private party functions: 
Representative democracy in any populous unit of governance 
is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together 
in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse 
their political views. The formation of national political 
parties was almost concurrent with the formation of the 
Republic itself. Consistent with this tradition, the Court has 
recognized that the First Amendment protects “the freedom to 
join together in furtherance of common political beliefs,” 
which “necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the 
people who constitute the association, and to limit the 
association to those people only.” That is to say, a corollary of 
the right to associate is the right not to associate. “Freedom of 
association would prove an empty guarantee if associations 
could not limit control over their decisions to those who share 
the interests and persuasions that underlie the association’s 
being.”63 
 Citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, Scalia reasoned that 
as a regulation on the freedom of association, reform to closed primaries must 
be viewed with strict scrutiny.64 Respondents thus offered several state 
interests, the first two included “producing elected officials who better 
represent the electorate and expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of 
partisan concerns.”65 Scalia, however, quickly dismissed these interests as a 
                                                     
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 578. In this section, Scalia discussed “crossover voting,” where faithful members of 
one party would vote in the opposite primary in order to nominate a candidate they thought 
their nominee would beat. Id. at 579. For support, he cited statistics from the trial record: 
“[I]n one 1997 survey of California voters 37 percent of Republicans said that they planned 
to vote in the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial primary, and 20 percent of Democrats said they 
planned to vote in the 1998 Republican United States Senate primary.” Id. at 578. 
63 Id. at 572 (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214–15 (1986); Wisconsin., 450 U.S. at 122 (1981)). 
64 Id. at 582 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) 
(“Regulations imposing severe burdens [on parties’ rights] must be narrowly tailored and 
advance a compelling state interest.”)).  
65 Id. 
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“stark repudiation of freedom of political association: Parties should not be 
free to select their own nominees because those nominees, and the positions 
taken by those nominees, will not be congenial to the majority.”66  
Respondents also asserted the right to vote as their third compelling 
interest.67 They claimed that independents and members of the minority party 
in certain districts “are disenfranchised [by closed primary systems] . . . 
because . . . they are unable to participate in what amounts to be the 
determinative election—the majority party’s primary . . . .”68 Respondents 
argued “the only way to ensure [independents and members of a minority 
party] have an ‘effective’ vote is to force the party to open its primary to 
them.”69 Justice Scalia explained, however, that disenfranchisement “also 
appear[ed] to be nothing more than reformulation of an asserted state 
interest,” which he had already rejected.70 He wrote: 
The voter’s desire to participate does not become more 
weighty simply because the State supports it . . . The voter 
who feels himself disenfranchised should simply join the 
party. That may put him to a hard choice, but it is not a state-
imposed restriction upon his freedom of association, whereas 
compelling party members to accept his selection of their 
nominee is a state-imposed restriction upon theirs.71 
 In sum, Justice Scalia stated that each interest proffered by the state 
was not compelling, nor was Proposition 198 narrowly tailored.72 To 
conclude, Scalia noted, “The burden Proposition 198 places on petitioners’ 
rights of political association is both severe and unnecessary.”73 He further 
wrote: 
When the State seeks to regulate a political party’s nomination 
process as a means to shape and control political doctrine and 
the scope of political choice, the First Amendment gives 
substantial protection to the party from the manipulation. In a 
                                                     
66 Id. 




71 Id. at 583–84. 
72 Id. at 585. 
73 Id. 
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free society the State is directed by political doctrine, not the 
other way around.74 
C. Democratic Party of Washington v. Reed 
 Consistent with Jones, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the right of political 
parties to control the administration of their primary elections in 2003.75 In 
Reed, Washington’s blanket primary system was deemed an unconstitutional 
infringement on the rights of state parties.76 The challenged system was 
similar to that found as unconstitutional in California in 2000, but also 
allowed candidates to be listed with their respective party affiliations.77 The 
Democratic Party of Washington, along with the Republican and Libertarian 
parties of the state, sued based on an infringement to their constitutional 
rights to freedom of association.78  
While the State of Washington argued that implementation of a 
blanket primary imposed a rational burden on the parties,79 the Ninth Circuit 
found the burden irrelevant; instead, the statute could be determined 
unconstitutional on its face, consistent with precedent in Jones.80 The state 
argued their system was distinguishable from California’s because 
Washington did not register voters by party, and thus “as the State’s brief puts 
it, because of its non-partisan registration, the winners of the primary ‘[were] 
the “nominees” not of the parties but of the electorate.’”81 Washington 
reasoned that because its registration system was nonpartisan, a blanket 
primary did not violate any political party’s associational rights.82 The court 
concluded, however, that Washington’s system was indistinguishable from 
that challenged in Jones:  
These are distinctions without a difference. That the voters do 
not reveal their party preferences at a government registration 
desk does not mean that they do not have them. The 
                                                     
74 Id. at 590 (Kennedy, concurring).  
75 See Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 1201–02.  
78 Id. at 1201.  
79 Id. at 1203. 
80 Id. (“The Supreme Court does not set out an analytic scheme whereby the political parties 
submitted evidence establishing that they were burdened. Instead, Jones infers the burden 
from the face of the blanket primary statutes. We accordingly follow the same analytic 
approach as Jones.”). 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
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Washington scheme denies party adherents the opportunity to 
nominate their party’s candidate free of the risk of being 
swamped by voters whose preference is for the other party.83 
 Relying on the same rationale as California in Jones, Washington 
further argued that the change to the primary system increased voter 
participation and reduced political corruption, which were sufficiently 
compelling state interests to withstand strict scrutiny. However, this 
argument remained unpersuasive to the court, as it was still relying on 
Jones.84 The Ninth Circuit instead found the remedy to corruption and lack 
of moderacy was not to impose a blanket primary on the state, but to simply 
let voters vote for someone else.85 
D. Washington State Grant v. Washington State Republican Party 
The Supreme Court departed from its most recent precedent in Jones 
and Reed, however, in deciding Washington State Grange v. Washington 
State Republican Party in 2008.86 Following passage of the aforementioned 
Initiative 872, creating the state’s top-two primary, the Republican Party of 
Washington filed suit against county and state officials to bar its 
implementation—arguing that it unconstitutionally infringed on the rights of 
political parties to control who they endorsed and with whom they 
associated.87 Showcasing a specific issue with Initiative 872, the Republican 
Party, joined again by the Democratic and Libertarian parties of the state, also 
argued the law interfered with the rights of the parties to choose who could 
utilize the party designation on the ballot, as it allowed for self-designation.88  
Determining the legitimacy of Initiative 872, the Court’s majority, in 
an opinion written by Justice Thomas, declined to consider the hypothetical 
impact of the Initiative on future Washington elections.89 Thomas’s approach 
                                                     
83 Id. at 1204.  
84 Id. at 1205–06.  
85 Id. at 1207 (“The remedy available to the Grangers and the people of the State of 
Washington for a party that nominates candidates carrying a message adverse to their 
interests is to vote for someone else, not to control whom the party's adherents select to carry 
their message.”).  
86 See generally, Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 
442 (2008).  
87 Id. at 444.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 449–50 (noting “a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by "establish[ing] 
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid," i.e., that the law is 
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required the plaintiffs to demonstrate the law would never be constitutional—
an impossible burden given the law had not yet taken effect.90  
Ultimately, Thomas wrote of the broad power of the states to regulate 
the election process for state offices, and explained that this broad authority 
is only invalid when it violates the “specific provisions of the Constitution.”91 
Respondents relied heavily on Jones and asked the Court to reaffirm “the 
special place the First Amendment reserves for, and the special protection it 
accords, the process by which a political party ‘select[s] a standard bearer 
who best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’”92 
The parties’ flaw in comparing Washington’s Initiative 872 to 
California’s Proposition 14 in Jones, however, was that the language of the 
Initiative did not mention the choice of a party nominee;93 instead, the 
Initiative sought to eliminate the importance of party affiliation altogether. 
According to the Court, “The essence of nomination—the choice of a party 
representative—does not occur under I-872. The law never refers to the 
candidates as nominees of any party, nor does it treat them as such.”94 In fact, 
Justice Thomas opined that the Initiative did the opposite: “[T]he election 
regulations specifically provide that the primary ‘does not serve to determine 
the nominees of a political party but serves to winnow the number of 
candidates to a final list of two for the general election.’”95 Thomas reasoned 
that parties could still nominate candidates outside of the state-administered 
primary.96 
To counter, Respondents claimed that “even if the I-872 primary does 
not actually choose parties’ nominees, it nevertheless burdens their 
associational rights because voters will assume that candidates on the general 
                                                     
unconstitutional in all of its applications”) (citing and implementing the rationale of United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).  
90 Id. at 450 (“In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go 
beyond the statute's facial requirements and speculate about “hypothetical” or “imaginary” 
cases.”) (citing United States v. Raines, 372 U.S. 17 (1960) (stating “the delicate power of 
pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to 
hypothetical cases thus imagined")). 
91 Id. at 451 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968)).  
92 Id. at 453 (citing Jones, 530 U.S. at 567) (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
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election ballot are the nominees of their preferred parties.”97 The Court again 
refused, however, to strike down Initiative 872 based solely on speculation.98 
Agreeing with Respondents, Justices Scalia and Kennedy strongly 
dissented.99 They wrote:  
The electorate's perception of a political party's beliefs is 
colored by its perception of those who support the party; and 
a party's defining act is the selection of a candidate and 
advocacy of that candidate's election by conferring upon him 
the party's endorsement. When the state-printed ballot for the 
general election causes a party to be associated with 
candidates who may not fully (if at all) represent its views, it 
undermines both these vital aspects of political association.100 
Scalia and Kennedy bluntly concluded that the state’s intention in enacting 
Initiative 872 was not to convey the will of the people, but to reduce the 
effectiveness of the state’s political parties.101 They stated: 
Washington seeks to reduce the effectiveness of that 
endorsement by allowing any candidate to use the ballot for 
drawing upon the goodwill that a party has developed, while 
preventing the party from using the ballot to reject the claimed 
association or to identify the genuine candidate of its choice. 
This does not merely place the ballot off limits for party 
building; it makes the ballot an instrument by which party 
building is impeded, permitting unrebutted associations that 
the party itself does not approve.102 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy essentially argued that the law fails facially, 
similar to Jones, even without speculative outcomes from either side, as the 
stated purpose deviates from the actual purpose of the law—to undercut the 
rights of political parties, distort their message, and hijack the goodwill 
political parties have cultivated.103  
                                                     
97 Id. at 454. 
98 Id. at 454–55 (“There is simply no basis to presume that a well-informed electorate will 
interpret a candidate's party-preference designation to mean that the candidate is the party's 
chosen nominee or representative or that the party associates with or approves of the 
candidate.”) (citing New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 
1, 13–14 (1988)).  
99 Id. at 462 (Scalia, dissenting). 
100 Id. (Scalia, dissenting). 
101 Id. (Scalia, dissenting).   
102 Id. at 464–65.  
103 Id. at 466.  
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III. WHY THE U.S. DOESN’T NEED NATIONAL PRIMARY REFORM 
The biggest ideological factor in favor of the creation of a nationwide 
jungle primary system is moderacy, a phenomenon akin to Bigfoot in 2018 
as polarization is on the rise.104 Today, in California specifically, “top-two 
backers argue that a large boost in voters’ approval of the California state 
legislature is a direct result of lawmakers’ increased productivity, which they 
say is rooted in the top-two system . . . .”105 They assert that the closed 
primary “was producing ideologically extreme candidates who were forced 
to appeal to the most fervent wings of their party, and that was leading to 
gridlock instead of governance.”106 Like Washington, to combat said 
gridlock, Californians introduced the top-two primary in order to ensure 
“candidates would be forced to moderate their appeals to win a broader 
section of the electorate.”107  
                                                     
104 Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2016), 
http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/. 
The unfavorable views between political parties are discussed further in the article: 
For the first time in surveys dating to 1992, majorities in both parties 
express not just unfavorable but very unfavorable views of the other party. 
And today, sizeable shares of both Democrats and Republicans say the 
other parties stirs feelings of not just frustration, but fear and anger. . . . 
Across a number of realms, negative feelings about the opposing party are 
as powerful—and in many cases more powerful—as are positive feelings 
about one’s own party. . . . These sentiments are not just limited to views 
of the parties and their policy proposals; they have a personal element as 
well. 
Eric McGhee & Boris Shor, Has the Top Two Primary Elected More Moderates?, 
15 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1053, 1054 (2017). As stated in McGhee and Shor’s article: 
If primaries are an important cause of polarization, the most commonly 
proposed reform has been to open primaries to participation by voters 
outside the party faithful. With open primaries, the median of the primary 
electorate moves closer to the median of the general electorate, making it 
less likely that the preferences of each party’s base voters will determine 
the final outcome. 
Id.  
105 Russell Berman, ‘This is Not a Reform. It is Terrible.’, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/california-top-two-jungle-primary-
democrats-republicans/561689/.  
106 Nagourney, supra note 11. 
107 Id. 
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Political advocates of open primaries concur; many argue moderate 
candidates cannot find success in closed primaries because they risk being 
ousted just for compromising: 
Today, few elected officials value moderation, because the 
electorate they are responsible to is not itself moderate. They 
don’t worry about the next general election, but they do fret 
mightily about offending their base and triggering a challenge 
in the ever-looming primary contest. To their base, any whiff 
of compromise becomes sedition, and legislators are, above 
all, rational actors, clued in to their own self-interest.108 
Accordingly, because an open primary does not require a two-party race in 
the general election, “the resulting candidates . . . can more accurately reflect 
preferences of the median voter, especially in situations where one party is 
clearly dominant over another.”109 Enthusiasts proffer that as a result, 
“[p]artisan loyalists would still be able to vote for their preferred candidates; 
however, moderates and Independents would not have to choose to vote the 
ballot of one party or the other, and could even switch ‘party affiliation’ while 
going down the ballot.’”110 Theoretically, this premise makes sense, as the 
voters that turn out for primary elections are not your general election voters; 
instead, primary voters are “a small proportion of highly energized, 
ideologically driven” part of the electorate.111 
Data evidence from these states, however, cannot conclusively 
pinpoint a reason for polarization, nor can it suggest a return to moderacy.112 
In fact, “evidence that changing the rules can change the underlying 
dysfunctional dynamic of Congress is relatively weak.”113 Eric McGhee, 
                                                     
108 Shea, supra note 2.   
109 Zhang, supra note 7; see also Zhou, supra note 22. As stated in Zhou’s article: 
Proponents for this kind of primary argue that it more closely reflects the 
will of the broader electorate—unlike primaries that are limited to party 
membership, which tend to trend toward more extreme candidates and 
policy positions. Because voters have the option to evaluate candidates 
from both parties, more moderate options may have a better chance of 
advancing. 
Id. 
110 Zhang, supra note 7.   
111 Schumer, supra note 15. 
112 See generally McGhee & Schor, supra note 104. 
113 Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 
989, 1012 (2013). Hasen states: 
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research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, and Boris Shor, 
visiting assistant professor at Georgetown University, used roll call vote data 
to identify changes in California and Washington legislators’ ideological 
dispositions.114 The pair found that “the lion’s share of polarization” does not 
come from closed primaries: 
The broadest studies to date of the effect of primaries on 
representation have been consistent with the null effects from 
election research: neither the competitiveness of the primary 
election, the extremeness of the primary electorate, nor most 
critically, the type of primary system, seems to have much 
effect on the ideology of those who are ultimately elected.115 
Thus, “tinkering with . . . external rules of election [is] likely to make only 
modest inroads at best in the polarization and dysfunction currently afflicting 
our national politics.”116 
While California has shown slow, moderate progress since the 
institution of the top-two framework according to McGhee and Shor,117 after 
three election cycles, the jungle primary has frustrated both voters and 
politicians on every side of the aisle. Specifically, Democratic House 
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Republican House Majority Leader Kevin 
McCarthy, renowned politicians from California’s own Congressional 
delegation, both “despise” the system.118 Political scientists have found “[t]he 
electorate is still voting tribally,” treating the state as if it were part of a closed 
                                                     
While some blame internal rules (as opposed to constitutional structure) 
for the disfunction [in Congress], others blame outside election rules such 
as closed primaries and partisan gerrymandering. The theory is that closed 
primaries and gerrymandering lead to more extreme candidates who are 
unwilling to compromise in Congress. . . .  Eric McGhee, Seth Masket, 
Boris Shor, Steven Rogers, and Nolan McCarty studied variations in state 
primary systems over two decades and found little evidence that more open 
primaries produced moderation by legislators. 
Id. 
114 See generally McGhee & Schor, supra note 104. 
115 Id. at 1056. 
116 Hasen, supra note 113. 
117 McGhee & Schor, supra note 104, at 1063. 
118 Berman, supra note 105. 
196 VYING TO BE KING OF THE JUNGLE Vol. 4 
primary system: “Republicans for Republicans, Democrats for 
Democrats.”119  
Most recently, the closed system in Iowa prohibited 36% of Iowa’s 
voters who register as independent or no party, from being able to show up 
on primary day,120 arguably leaving them disenfranchised. The primary 
disenfranchisement argument, however, begs the response; what is a 
primary’s central purpose? Primaries were not created to serve voters in 
general, as they serve, first and foremost, parties and their registered 
members: “If I’m not part of that party, I have no more right to decide its 
nominees than a Seahawks fan has to determine whether Peyton Manning 
plays for the Broncos next season or a Coca-Cola drinker has to decide on a 
new Pepsi formula.”121 As a party function, many consider the inability to 
vote in a primary without party registration a fact of life, rather than 
disenfranchisement. A closed primary system ultimately “gives [voters] an 
incentive to register for the party, and it rewards those who commit to 
becoming team players."122  
 Top-two systems, furthermore, pose a substantial threat to legitimate 
political diversity on the ballot. Politically homogenous districts and states in 
general that are dark red or dark blue run the risk of dividing majority party 
votes in so many directions during primary season that they are left with only 
two options from the minority party in the general election. For example, in 
California the top-two system could become a liability where “a trio of GOP-
held districts that Hillary Clinton carried in 2016, several viable Democrats 
are running, raising the possibility of a splintered vote that could allow two 
Republicans to narrowly capture the general-election slots.”123 The result of 
such splintering when the House of Representatives is at stake could be 
catastrophic for the Democratic Party, potentially allowing two Republican 
candidates to become the only individuals on the ballot without any showing 
from the dominant party in the dark blue state. A crowded campaign field in 
                                                     
119 George Skelton, Give California’s Top-Two Primary Some More Time, and if It Doesn’t 
Get Better, Junk It, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2018, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-skelton-top-two-views-20180611-story.html.  
120 Editorial: Law Prohibits All Iowans from Voting in Primaries, KCCI DES MOINES (June 
2, 2018 6:14 PM), https://www.kcci.com/article/editorial-law-prohibits-all-iowans-from-
voting-in-primaries/21059522.  
121 Masket, supra note 2. 
122 Stein, supra note 14.  
123 Berman, supra note 105.  
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the primary has proven disastrous for the major parties, resulting in 
“intraparty warfare and pleading with candidates to drop out of congressional 
races for the sake of the party.”124 
 Held constitutional for now, top-two systems call into question 
whether other voting systems, such as federal protections by statute or 
amendment, could be superior. Though enticing, in the name of protecting 
political association, a federalized, mandated open primary system is contrary 
to the standards and protections already granted by the Constitution; it is not 
a new law that is needed, it is a consistent interpretation of the rights of 
political parties to the First Amendment freedom of association.  
CONCLUSION 
 National, federal, mandated open primary reform is not the answer to 
Congress’ polarization problem. Not only do top-two primaries pose 
significant constitutional issues for political parties, but like Senator Schumer 
and House Minority Leader Pelosi note, they do not create the moderacy for 
which they were intended. New legal challenges are needed in order to 
achieve judicial unity beyond facial challenges, all in an effort to return to the 
successful, clearly constitutional closed primary systems that adequately 
represent the two-party democratic republic of the United States. Relying on 
the freedom of association, political parties, under our national republic, have 
the right to choose their candidates. In sum, “it is of paramount importance 
to allow political parties to freely associate by choosing who may participate 
in their nomination process. . . . This means both preserving the right to 
include and to exclude.”125 
                                                     
124 Id. 
125 Jamie Gregorian, How Primary Election Laws Adversely Affect the Associational Rights 
of Political Parties in the Commonwealth of Virginia and How to Fix Them, 18 GEO. MASON. 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 135, 164 (2007). 
